Gorenje point: Fighting in Ethiopia threatens to escalate into a regional conflict

The States located along the Red Sea are on the verge of a regional war. Fighting between the Ethiopian government army and the forces of the northern Tigray region has already spread beyond its borders, and the country's military leadership accuses neighboring Eritrea, Sudan and even Egypt of supporting the rebels. Further escalation may draw these states into the conflict, experts do not rule out. The risks for foreign projects are also growing. Ethiopia is implementing a number of joint initiatives with Russia, including plans to build a nuclear power plant and an aluminum plant worth about $1 billion.

Why has the conflict escalated in Ethiopia

A new round of civil war in Ethiopia threatens to escalate into a regional conflict. Over the past week, active fighting has been going on in the north of the country between government forces and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Tigray (PFOT). On September 23, FLN forces took control of the airports in Makel, Aksum and Shire and launched an offensive in the neighboring Afar and Amhara regions. The federal forces managed to stop their advance in a number of directions and launch a counteroffensive. On September 28, government units captured the strategic town of Alamata in southern Tigray.

The conflict between the NFOT and the federal center began back in 2018, after the current Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, came to power. Previously, immigrants from the Tigray region played a leading role in public administration for decades (in fact, the NFL was the ruling party of Ethiopia from 1991 to 2018), but under the new cabinet they lost a significant part of their influence, controlling, in fact, only their region.

The final break came in 2020, when federal authorities postponed national elections due to the pandemic, and the region held its own vote, which Addis Ababa declared illegal. A few months later, the confrontation escalated into an armed conflict that lasted until November 2022 and ended with the signing of the Pretoria Agreement.

However, the fate of the disputed western regions of Tigray has not been resolved, Ivan Kopyttsev, an expert at the RISI Africa Center, told Izvestia. In addition, Eritrea and the ethno-nationalist militia "Fano", which supported government forces in the battles of 2020-2022, remained outside the framework of that peace agreement.

An additional catalyst for the current escalation was the internal split in the NFL: moderate forces that advocated dialogue with the federal center lost ground, giving way to hardliners, the expert explained.

Before the new offensive, the NFOT joined forces with six other armed groups opposed to the government of Abiy Ahmed. The allies included even Tigray's recent opponents, in particular, the Fano fighters. The Ethiopian government's relations with Eritrea, which also supported Addis Ababa during the conflict of 2020-2022, deteriorated sharply. The main reason was Ethiopia's desire to secure direct access to the Red Sea, including through the Eritrean port of Aseb.

After the outbreak of hostilities, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ethiopian armed forces, Birhanu Jula, accused not only Eritrea, but also Sudan and Egypt of supporting anti-government forces. The States themselves reject these accusations. At the same time, Addis Ababa's relations with them are already burdened with serious contradictions. Egypt has been arguing with Ethiopia for many years over the Vozrozhdenie dam on the Blue Nile: Cairo fears that its work could reduce the volume of water entering the country. And with Sudan, the situation is worsened by territorial issues.

The knot of contradictions in the Horn of Africa is tightening, noted Ivan Kopyttsev. The Eritrean factor remains particularly sensitive: the former alliance of Asmara and Addis Ababa has collapsed, and their interests in the Red Sea now diverge diametrically.

However, the crisis will not necessarily escalate into a full-fledged regional war, Kopyttsev believes. Government forces managed to repel the first attacks and launch a counterattack, but Tigray's forces and their allies still have the resources to continue the campaign. The main risk of external interference is the direct involvement of Eritrea, and an additional threat is the possible transfer of clashes to the area of the strategic Addis Ababa-Djibouti transport corridor, which accounts for over 95% of Ethiopia's foreign trade.

Unbalance the balance: Ethiopia risks a return to a major war

What could the fighting in the north of the country mean for cooperation with Russia and the nuclear power plant project

What will happen to Russian projects

The Russian Embassy has no information on the presence of Russians in combat areas, and there have also been no requests for help. The diplomatic mission told Izvestia that they are in close contact with the Ethiopian authorities on the security of Russian citizens and projects being implemented in the country.

"There have been no direct threats to the implementation of Russian—Ethiopian projects," the diplomatic mission said.

Nuclear energy remains the main area of cooperation between the two countries. In September 2025, Rosatom and the relevant departments of Ethiopia agreed on an action plan for the construction of a nuclear power plant, and on March 31, 2026, they consolidated the agreements by signing a strategic roadmap. The document also includes the preparation of a feasibility study, site selection, creation of a specialized regulatory framework and staff training.

Rusal is also developing a major project in Ethiopia. In November 2025, the company signed a memorandum with the state-owned Ethiopian Investment Holdings on the construction of an aluminum plant with a capacity of 500 thousand tons per year. The cost of its first stage is estimated at about $1 billion. At the conclusion of the transaction, the partners announced the creation of a joint technical committee, which has already begun to select a site and develop a feasibility study.

Moscow called on the parties to cease fire and comply with previously reached agreements. External players should refrain from any interference in Ethiopia's internal affairs, the Russian Foreign Ministry said on September 25.

Russia has a fairly strong position in Africa, and good relations with Egypt and Ethiopia, which are members of the BRICS. However, so far the African Union has played a major role as an external mediator. On September 23, his leadership demanded to immediately stop the escalation and return to direct negotiations within the framework of the Pretoria Agreement. Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was involved in the settlement of the 2020-2022 conflict, was even brought back to work.

One way or another, Ethiopia has no access to the sea, and its foreign trade depends on the functioning of the Djibouti corridor, which may be under threat. Therefore, the further expansion of hostilities can affect the investment attractiveness of the country and, as a result, the timing of joint Russian-Ethiopian projects.