Europe has cornered itself with the desire to take away Russian assets. Analysis
The European Union continues to discuss how it can use frozen Russian assets. One of the options is to provide Ukraine with a €140 billion reparations loan. At the same time, much more funds have been frozen in the accounts of European states, but almost nothing is known about their fate. Unwillingness to disclose information about them may indicate that misuse has already occurred. What you need to know about Russian assets in the West is in the Izvestia article.
Which Russian assets are frozen in the West
• Usually, Russian assets frozen in the West are understood as the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Russia, a strategic reserve that ensures the financial and economic stability of the country. Back in March 2022, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov estimated Russian air defense systems at $640 billion, of which $300 billion were frozen in Western countries.
• Gold and foreign exchange reserves usually consist of monetary gold in the form of bullion and coins, assets in foreign currency (including deposits, cash and securities denominated in foreign currency), special drawing rights (a special unit of account of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) and reserve positions in the IMF. The last two positions are usually too small a proportion to be seriously considered.
• Specific information about which assets of the Central Bank have been frozen in the West has not been disclosed. However, it is well known that gold does not belong to them, since it is stored in Russia, foreign currency located in the Russian Federation and assets placed in the currencies of countries that have not joined the sanctions. As of November, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation estimated Russian air defense systems at $725 billion, of which $300 billion is gold and $397 billion is reserves in foreign currency. Most of the latter relates to frozen assets.
• At the same time, it is worth remembering that the term "frozen Russian assets" includes not only the Central Bank's ZRS. The property and accounts of individuals and companies, including individual investors who bought shares of foreign corporations on the stock exchange, also remain blocked in the West. According to rough estimates, this is still up to $120 billion. However, there is no question of using these funds in any way.
• The securities that belong to the Central Bank and have been frozen are mainly government bonds of countries that have imposed sanctions. IOUS are both short-term and long-term. They must constantly receive coupon income, and at the end of their validity period they must be converted into currency. Theoretically, shares of private companies could also be frozen, but the government usually does not invest in such assets because of their riskiness and is limited to bonds. The exact "composition" of Russian securities, what kind of income they generate and whether any of them have been repaid, has not been disclosed.
Where exactly are the assets located
• There is no absolute clarity about exactly where and to what extent the blocked assets are stored. As a rule, when it comes to the plans of the European Union for the use of assets, we mean the "largest piece", which is stored in Belgium in the Euroclear depository. At the end of June 2025, he estimated the volume of available Russian assets at €194 billion. At the same time, the media usually uses a figure of 140 billion euros, which is exactly the amount the European Union wants to use, without explaining its plans for the remaining assets.
• Russian assets are stored not only in Belgium. They are also reliably located in Germany, France and Luxembourg within the European Union, but the exact volumes are unknown. Regarding Luxembourg, it was assumed that the volume of assets in it reaches €20 billion, but its Ministry of Finance says it has only a tiny amount of € 10,000. France and Germany refuse to disclose the data, but the media reports data on €19 billion and €210 million. The total assets in the EU countries are estimated at €210 billion.
• In Europe, frozen assets are also held by the United Kingdom and Switzerland, which are not members of the European Union and do not participate in discussions about their possible use. Switzerland admits that it holds about €8 billion of Russian assets, but there is no specific data for the UK. Outside of Europe, frozen Russian assets are also held by the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan, of which only the United States has disclosed data on the exact amount — about 4.5 billion euros.
• Several factors contribute to confusion about Russian assets frozen in the West. Firstly, assets are periodically reassessed, they can both rise in price and fall. Secondly, the media often put data for different time periods in the same row, and also do not specify the countries in which assets are stored and which discuss their use. Thirdly, assets tend to generate income, which in turn can be taxed, and this also affects how to specifically assess their total volume.
Use of Russian assets
• The EU is interested in the misappropriation of Russian frozen assets. They can use these funds for several purposes. First of all, European states declare their intention to strengthen their own defense. In the next ten years, the unification states are going to allocate about €6.8 trillion for military needs. In general, the volume of the European military-industrial complex is planned to increase 5-10 times in 2028-2034.
• However, economic problems are unlikely to achieve the goals set. In particular, the national debt of France, one of the largest EU economies, may reach 128% of GDP by 2030. Also, the average government budget deficit in the EU has already reached 81%. Only a small group of EU countries is able to increase defense spending by 1.5% of GDP without significant consequences for their finances. This list includes Portugal, Denmark, Cyprus, Ireland, Greece and Luxembourg. Their budgets are in a stable enough state to withstand the additional burden.
• At the same time, even if the European Union gathers the necessary resources, the transformation of money into a real military potential remains questionable. Industrial coordination between the countries is far from ideal, and disputes over security priorities are only intensifying. Against this background, the prospect of a rapid build-up of European military power looks vague. In addition, the arms race threatens to further increase tensions with Russia.
• Brussels also wants to help rebuild Ukraine. In particular, the Verkhovna Rada reported that the losses of the frontline regions exceeded $600 billion. However, on November 12, the European Commission and the IMF have already stopped issuing commercial loans to Ukraine. The EU is trying to promote a scheme of "reparation loans" worth 140 billion euros, which actually implies the withdrawal of Russian money. Belgium and Euroclear opposed it, warning of serious legal risks. The EU itself no longer has extra resources due to high inflation and a heavy burden on budgets, while Ukraine's needs for 2026-2027 are estimated at over €70 billion. Moscow emphasizes that it regards any actions with its assets as theft.
• If the EU tries to embezzle Russian money, it could undermine confidence in the European financial system. Such a move would trigger a crisis in European markets. Belgium would be particularly vulnerable in such a situation. For her, Euroclear, a structure serving international assets, serves as the backbone of a significant part of the financial sector. That is why any drastic decision around Russian assets creates a risk of serious shocks for the Belgian economy, as well as for the EU as a whole.
Missing funds
• Another idea discussed regarding Russian assets was the withdrawal of $100 billion in favor of the United States — such a proposal appears in the drafts of peace agreements on Ukraine. The EU strongly opposes this idea. France is particularly active in blocking any plans that would allow Washington to gain direct control over these funds. In Paris, they emphasize that we are talking about property located in the EU, included in European programs and therefore can only be used in accordance with the decision of the member states.
• One of the possible reasons for the European resistance is that the proceeds from the long-term placement of Russian funds in the Belgian Euroclear have actually already been distributed, because the EU has already provided Ukraine with multibillion-dollar loans. If the assets go to the Americans, the balance of the European budget will be in the red. Formally, it would be possible to compensate for the deficit with emissions, but internal conflicts between the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) make such a step almost impossible. The ECB opposes expropriations and large-scale financing of Kiev.
• It would also explain why a significant part of the funds frozen in Europe outside Belgium are actually classified and not disclosed by France and Germany. The "missing" money could have been used by European governments in a not entirely transparent way. Therefore, any interference from the United States creates the risk of revealing unpleasant details. Prolonging the conflict and formalizing the expropriation of assets in favor of the European Union reduces such risks. Russia is unlikely to be able to recover its reserves, but political damage to the EU by disclosing details of the use of Russian assets could become an instrument of pressure.
When writing the material, Izvestia took into account the opinion of:
- analyst, journalist, author of the Crimson Digest channel Ivan Danilov;
- Izvestia columnist Andrey Kuzmak.
Переведено сервисом «Яндекс Переводчик»
