"The United States can't just tell Europe, 'That's it, we're washing our hands of it.'

The United States will not be able to get out of the conflict in Ukraine by shifting all responsibility to Europe, George Bibi, the former head of the CIA's analytical department for Russia, told Izvestia. The crisis can be eliminated only after the normalization of relations between the Russian Federation and the United States. However, the logic in the White House is exactly the opposite. Meanwhile, the lack of control over nuclear arsenals and the minimum trust between Moscow and Washington make the current situation similar to the eve of the First World War. Although the new meeting between Lavrov and Rubio in Manila means that the door is not closed yet. About the "problem of the first step" in dialogue with Russia and the failure of the American-Israeli strategy in the Middle East — in an exclusive interview with a former CIA analyst to Izvestia.

"It's very difficult for Washington to get out of the game altogether"

— Donald Trump hoped to quickly resolve the conflict in Ukraine, but after the outbreak of war with Iran, the dialogue stalled. Could the administration eventually pull back from the settlement?

— Hints that the United States might wash its hands of Ukraine and say, "This is not our war, let Europe bear the burden of supporting Ukraine itself," were heard from the very beginning. And in part, the Trump administration has already revised its approach to Kiev: the bulk of the costs now fall not on American taxpayers, but on Europe.

But it is very difficult for Washington to get out of the game altogether. I do not consider what is happening to be a truly bilateral conflict between Russia and Ukraine, although many in the United States and Europe see it exactly as if Russia once looked at its neighbor, decided that the border was not there, and went to take its own. In fact, this is a multidimensional confrontation. Yes, there is a two—way layer - territories, borders, the situation of linguistic minorities. But there is also a much larger dimension: the geopolitical conflict between Russia and the West as a whole.

— What is its essence, in your opinion?

— The conflict, in fact, began after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany. Then the question arose: what should the architecture of European security look like now that there is no more confrontation between the West and the Warsaw Pact Organization led by the USSR? This fundamental question has not been sorted out — what should be the basis of security in the post-bipolar era, what role is assigned to Russia, and what rules should it play by?

The United States cannot escape from this. We are an integral part of this system, and everything that happens to European security affects us as well. We can't just tell Europe, "That's it, we're washing our hands of it, we're leaving NATO, we're curtailing the nuclear umbrella over our allies, and we're closing in on defending our own continent." And no matter how tempting the Trump administration may seem to think "this is not our problem, we are separated by an ocean," this will not work in the nuclear age. We don't have an ocean separating the United States from Russian missiles.

Excessive price: the 21st package may become the last major block of EU sanctions

Brussels will continue to put pressure on Russia, but will focus on expanding blacklists and combating circumvention of restrictions.

— What should Washington do then?

— I shared my views with American officials on what is happening in Ukraine and US relations with Russia at the beginning of the Trump administration, when it was just formulating its approaches to these issues. Now I would advise you to listen to the recommendation of former US President Dwight D. Eisenhower regarding difficult issues: "If you cannot solve the problem, expand it." Washington has paid too little attention to the broader issue of the foundations of European security and the importance of stable strategic relations with Russia for the global order. The chronic instability in Europe, where new crises may arise that could bring NATO and Russia to the brink of direct conflict, is dangerous for the United States.

The Trump administration needs to stop thinking of itself as a mediator between two warring parties in a territorial dispute. We must admit that we ourselves are part of a larger geopolitical confrontation around the foundations of European security. And we have an important role to play here.

Neither the Ukrainian problem, nor European security, nor the larger task of stability in a changing world order, can be solved without normal relations with Russia. Those in which it is possible to discuss these issues, to seek a balance of interests, to negotiate where they diverge. And this is achievable — normalization is in the interests of both countries.

"It was exactly the same on the eve of the First World War"

— In February, the last bilateral nuclear agreement, the START Treaty, was terminated, and the agreements allegedly reached in Abu Dhabi on maintaining limits have not been formalized. How much does this increase the risks of escalation?

— We are in a very dangerous situation. We have no control over each other's nuclear arsenals, and there is no full—fledged diplomatic cooperation, either on conflict prevention or crisis management. And trust between governments is minimal. It's a powder keg.

On the eve of the First World War, it was exactly the same. Extremely low level of trust. Each side is convinced that it is only defending itself, and the other side perceives its defensive steps as a threat. The system of allied obligations also added fuel to the fire, dragging players into the war who were not at all eager to fight. Today's situation has much in common with what it was before 1914.

— But Europe and Washington seem to see the situation differently?

"That's the problem. Many in Washington and most in Europe mistakenly believe that we have an aggressor in front of us, a problem like the Second World War, and hence the logic: such a state must be contained by demonstrating determination and military might.

But if you apply the logic of deterrence to a World War I-type situation, you're only exacerbating the problem. This is exactly how military blocs operated before 1914 — demonstrating strength, increasing deterrence — and eventually unleashing a spiral of escalation, undermining trust and exacerbating the sense of threat on both sides. Such a situation is treated not by force, but by diplomacy: engagement, trust, and setting rules that stabilize the situation. Unfortunately, the Europeans are convinced of the opposite — that diplomacy only encourages aggression. In my opinion, this is an incorrect diagnosis, and the prescription based on it will only worsen the situation.

— There is little trust, but there are many ways to build it: inspections can be organized in the nuclear field and transparency can be increased. However, the dialogue, by and large, is frozen even in narrow areas — after the meeting between Lavrov and Rubio in Riyadh in early 2025, the work of the embassies has not been normalized. Why?

— The United States approached the matter as follows: first, the conflict in Ukraine must be resolved, and only then can serious progress be made on other issues — arms control, diplomatic relations, embassies. The calculation is to entice Moscow to improve relations in all directions at once and say: the key to everything is ending the conflict. They say that then the Russians will soften the demands.

There is a "first step problem". The United States says: "First, you will concede on what is important to us," and Russia replies: "First, show that you are generally ready to discuss major issues of European security." This is solved through engagement and mutual signals that each side understands the logic of the other. Washington should make it clear to Moscow that this is not about a couple of economic deals. Normalization of relations with Russia is in the United States' own strategic interests.

The new meeting between Lavrov and Rubio in Manila means that the door to a peaceful settlement in Ukraine and normalization of Russian-American relations has not yet been closed. But we need to do more than just preserve opportunities for diplomacy.

Shock-free deadline: The United States and Iran may enter into negotiations

The mediators are trying to achieve a ceasefire in the face of daily attacks

"The situation with Iran is an analytical mistake of the USA and Israel"

— In your research, you have repeatedly mentioned the security dilemma in relation to Russia. Is it the same with Iran?

— No, and that's the key difference. The security dilemma that I wrote about in my book about Russia is when both sides sincerely consider themselves defensive, but their steps are perceived by the other side as a threat, and an action–counteraction spiral is unwound. And in the situation with Iran, this is not a mutual misunderstanding, but an analytical mistake by the United States and Israel: the Iranian theocracy was mistaken for a house of cards and expected that once the leadership was "beheaded", the whole structure would collapse by itself.

This turned out to be a fundamental mistake. The regime has a considerable support base, and with the strike of the United States and Israel, we, in fact, made it more popular: the effect of "rallying around the flag" worked — Iranians who do not sympathize with the authorities rallied around the protection of the country, not the theocracy.

— Does the US deal with Saudi Arabia on uranium enrichment fit into the strategy for Iran?

— I hardly see a single strategy here at all. Her absence is a long—standing disease of US foreign policy, but it has worsened under Trump. Take Russia, for example: for many years, the policy towards it was not so much about the Russian-American relations themselves as about the sum of decisions on other issues that already affected relations with Moscow in hindsight. The Saudi story itself is counterproductive: if anything can push Iran towards nuclear weapons, it is the prospect of a Saudi nuclear program.

"It is already impossible to return to the pre-war situation"

— Has the point of no return on Iran been passed?

— It is already impossible to return to the pre-war situation. Previously, the possibility that Iran would completely block the Strait of Hormuz existed only on paper. Now we know that Iran can and will do this, but there is no military solution to the problem. At the same time, the ability to block Hormuz and hold the global economy hostage is almost equivalent to nuclear weapons, a powerful lever that gives Iran flexibility to make concessions on the same nuclear program.

— How to achieve a settlement in this case?

— The outlines of the deal are laid out in the signed memorandum of understanding, but now everything is very shaky. On the one hand, we need agreements that will make the creation of nuclear weapons impossible, which is a key interest of the United States. On the other hand, on the issue of control over Hormuz, Iran must propose a solution that allows Trump to save face: an option in which only Washington is inferior is unacceptable for Americans. Everything has stalled on these formulations: the language is deliberately vague, and each side puts its own meaning into it. It won't end well.: The parties are engaged in mutual destruction, in which there will be no winner.

— Is it worth waiting for de-escalation under the current administration?

— Trump has many incentives to find a way out of this situation. There are midterm elections in November, and this war is already less popular than the Vietnam war and is hurting the prospects of Republicans. At some point, we will have to tell the Iranians: let's find a compromise. But this requires wisdom and restraint. Whether the United States has enough of them is an open question.