Upheaval: Alawite areas of Syria are gripped by protests

After the change of power in Damascus, Syria has not fully recovered from the shocks: the contradictions that originated under the previous regime have only worsened in places. Mass protests broke out in Alawite areas, traditionally considered a stronghold of stability, and the number of civilians killed after the change of power reached 9,000, the Syrian Human Rights Monitoring Center (SOHR) told Izvestia. Strikes, clashes and growing sectarian tensions have become a test for the new Syrian authorities. Damascus is taking separate, albeit non-systemic, stabilization steps, including trials of participants in ethnic cleansing. The return of Russian patrols may also ease the severity of conflicts in certain areas.

What is happening in Syria after the change of power

A year has passed since the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad and the actual collapse of the military and security institutions. The resulting security vacuum led to increased chaos, and the new leadership faced deep economic and administrative problems. Against this background, the crime rate in the provinces has increased. The number of civilians killed after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad has reached 9,000, the Syrian Human Rights Monitoring Center (SOHR) told Izvestia.

— There is no unified army in Syria now, but there is a network of armed groups. We witnessed the massacre in March, which resulted in the killing of 1,700 Alawites. We saw the killings in Essaouida in July," SOHR told the publication.

The Alawite regions of Syria have been on strike for several days now. The protests began on December 8 at the call of the head of the Supreme Alawite Council, Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal. The participants demand a transition to a federal system of government that guarantees the political rights of the community, as well as an end to sectarian killings and other violations.

According to local activists, the protest spread to Latakia, Tartus, Jablebla, Baniyas and some neighborhoods of Homs in the first few days. Shops and businesses have closed in many cities: commercial life on the coast has virtually come to a standstill. At the same time, educational institutions and government agencies on the coast received orders to tighten attendance controls. Officials were required to stay at their workplaces full-time under threat of disciplinary sanctions, including dismissal. Letters distributed among employees, which the employees themselves consider provocative, could not turn the situation around — the strike expanded.

Against this background, clashes have occurred in a number of cities. According to the France-Presse news agency, protesters and government supporters clashed in Jableh: shots were fired, and several people were slightly injured. Witnesses reported that the protesters demanded the decentralization of power and the release of those who are considered illegally detained by the new leadership of Syria.

An additional reason for the increase in tension was the situation in Homs, where, after the murder of a Sunni family, accusations against the Alawites spread throughout the city. Shops and houses in Alawite areas were subjected to pogroms. The authorities imposed a curfew and later stated that the crime was criminal, not interfaith in nature.

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How are the new Syrian authorities responding to the crisis

The risk of a large-scale escalation around the Alawite protests is much higher today than a year ago, Nikolai Sukhov, a leading researcher at the Center for Middle East Studies at the IMEMO RAS, tells Izvestia.

— These protests may escalate into a large-scale escalation, but not because the community itself is seeking an interfaith confrontation. On the contrary, the Alawites demand to ensure security and deter armed groups. The danger is that any local protests can be interpreted by government groups as a "challenge," which will provoke retaliatory force measures and launch a cascade that already has precedents, the expert said.

The situation is also complicated by the advance of government forces into Druze al-Suwayda: in the region, this was perceived as an attempt to change the demographic and political balance, which is alarming for all minorities.

The ideological restrictions of Damascus do not allow the integration of ethnic and religious minorities, concludes Nikolai Sukhov. In a number of regions, the logic of "spoils of war" continues to work, when the property of Alawites, Christians or Ismailis is considered as a legitimate trophy. The expert emphasizes that the increased frequency of kidnappings, targeted killings and pressure on businesses remain a systemic problem, and the power vertical in Damascus operates fragmentarily and often autonomously. As a result, minorities receive neither security guarantees, nor political representation, nor mechanisms of protection from arbitrariness.

The new central cabinet is trying to restore the institutions of power, but its decisions are not accepted everywhere. Fighting between government forces and Kurdish forces has periodically resumed in the northeast, despite a cease-fire agreement reached in October by Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra and Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazlum Abdi.

According to orientalist Leonid Tsukanov, over the past year, Damascus has failed to fully regulate relations with ethnic and religious minorities.

"There are disagreements with the Kurds over security guarantees in exchange for disarmament and integration into the national armed forces; the Druze are suspected of being too close to Israel, and the Alawites are seen as "echoes" of the old regime," the expert told Izvestia.

In Damascus, the Druze are sometimes suspected of having too close relations with Israel because of the strong family and community ties connecting the Druze of the Golan and southern Syria, as well as because of occasional contacts interpreted as possible ways of external influence. As for the Alawites, this community was widely represented in the security structures of the former regime and the administrative apparatus of the government.

At the same time, Leonid Tsukanov added that the authorities are taking certain steps to find a common denominator, although so far these measures look rather crude and unsystematic. This includes, in particular, the transfer of units with a bad reputation from coastal areas to other provinces to reduce tensions in the Alawite communities. In addition, the authorities have tightened the recruitment and screening of personnel, centralizing recruitment through the Ministry of Defense and strengthening control over integrated groups. Finally, targeted trials have begun: in November, the first trial was held on the events of March on the coast, which is regarded as a willingness to respond to abuse.

"It can be noted that thanks to Russia's return to active patrolling in Syria, some of the friction has been reduced," he stressed.

Earlier, Syria TV reported on the visit of a Russian military delegation near Damascus and joint patrols in Quneitra province, just a few kilometers from the border with Israel. According to the Syrian media, the Russian officers arrived accompanied by Syrian representatives of the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Defense, and the convoy consisted of more than 15 vehicles.

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The Kurdish issue also remains on the agenda. On March 10, in Damascus, Mazlum Abdi and the President of the Syrian Transitional Government, Ahmed al-Sharaa, signed an agreement on the integration of Kurdish armed groups into the national army.

The document also provides for the transfer to the new Syrian administration of a number of civilian and military facilities in the northeast of the country, including airports and oil and gas fields, which are still de facto controlled by the Kurdish authorities.

However, the implementation of the agreements was blocked very quickly. The Kurdish side insists on maintaining autonomous institutions of self-government and the special status of its own security forces, while Damascus demands full subordination and inclusion of the northeastern territories in the national system. So far, all attempts to reach a compromise on key issues have not led to a result.

It is worth noting that the problems with ethno-religious communities did not begin with the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime. During his reign, conflicts between different groups also periodically arose in the country, and the political system was often used to strengthen the loyalty of individual communities, which influenced the current tensions. In particular, the Kurds remained stateless en masse until 2011, while the Druze regularly rebelled.