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- Slow fire: The Eastern Mediterranean is once again becoming a factor of geopolitical tension
Slow fire: The Eastern Mediterranean is once again becoming a factor of geopolitical tension
The final decision made by energy giants Eni and Total Energies to invest in the Cyprus Kronos field and Turkey's subsequent reciprocal announcement of the start of exploration for the construction of a gas pipeline to Northern Cyprus shifted the hypothetical scenario of confrontation in the region from theory to practical preparation. The essence of the potential conflict lies in the clash of strategic interests of several players at once, and the current crisis in the Gulf simultaneously accelerates its development and makes it difficult to find a hypothetical compromise. Who is fighting for what in the Eastern Mediterranean — in the material of Izvestia.
Object or reason
Eni and TotalEnergies have approved the final decision on investments in the development of the Kronos gas field located in Cyprus block No. 6. The volume of reserves exceeds 85 billion cubic meters, and the start of deliveries is scheduled for 2028.
The gas transportation scheme provides for its pumping through an underwater pipeline to the Egyptian Zohr field. Next, the raw materials will be sent to the LNG plant in Dumyat, from where they plan to supply liquefied gas to Europe. Kronos is the first real—life gas project in Cyprus. Experts note that it can become a key element of the updated energy logistics of the region.
Turkey, in turn, does not recognize the right to develop block No. 6, stating that it is located within its continental shelf, and insists on taking into account the interests of the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Ankara is ready to counteract the implementation of the project by any means and has relevant experience. In 2018, ships of the Republic's Navy had already obstructed the operation of the Eni vessel near another Cypriot site.
Thus, military and political guarantees will be required to secure the supply route. And, apparently, some European capitals and West Jerusalem are ready to provide them.
Reacting to the actions of market participants, Turkey has moved to more vigorous measures. Ankara has announced plans to conduct seismic surveys, as well as begin construction of a 101 km long underwater gas pipeline to connect the main territory of Turkey with Northern Cyprus.
The key feature of the project is that the pipeline will be able to transport fuel in two opposite directions. On the one hand, it will be possible to supply gas from Turkey to the south, on the other — to pump raw materials from the Eastern Mediterranean through Turkish territory towards Europe. Such a scheme can disrupt the strategic plans of opponents and radically change the balance of power in the region.
The conflict over the Eastern Mediterranean is caused by a whole range of reasons and goes far beyond the region — the interests of a number of world and regional powers intersect here.
Background of the issue
The plot of a new potential global conflict begins in the 2010s, when gas fields began to be found in the Eastern Mediterranean (until then, this region itself had never been singled out in political science). Leviathan and Tamar were discovered off the coast of Israel and Lebanon, Al—Zohr off the coast of Egypt, Aphrodite, Glaucus—1 and Calypso-1 around the island of Cyprus. The total volume of all these deposits is estimated by domestic experts at 3.5 trillion cubic meters, which is eight times less than that of Russia or Qatar, five times less than that of Turkmenistan, several times higher than the reserves of Azerbaijan or Norway and approximately equal to the studied volumes in Iraq.
It was known earlier that there is gas in the region.: Back in 1995, as part of the Oslo 1 Palestinian-Israeli agreement, Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin agreed that the autonomy would have the right to independently manage its natural resources (however, this did not happen in reality). Since 2003, active geological exploration has begun in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the volume of explored reserves has been rapidly increasing.
Meanwhile, for states and large businesses in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, as well as for other participants in the global gas market, this meant a renewed struggle for resources and control of logistics.
Legally, this issue is regulated by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), but existing geopolitical contradictions and ambitions, ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and unresolved territorial disputes are leading the region to a new conflict. And its first outlines are already clearly visible.
Initially, the Europeans saw the prospect of this. In 2015, the governments of Cyprus, Greece and Italy approved the EastMed gas pipeline project, which was supposed to connect Israeli fields with Europe, bypassing Turkey. However, the idea first encountered opposition from the left-liberal governments that came to power in Rome and Tel Aviv, and then completely stalled due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, Ankara's position has become an insurmountable obstacle. Turkey has not signed Unclos, and also supports the Republic of Northern Cyprus. Moreover, the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sees EastMed as a competitor to the Turkish Stream project.
Five reasons for tension
As relations between Ankara and West Jerusalem continued to deteriorate amid the escalation in the Gaza Strip, the parties attempted to gather allies. Since 2015, Israel has begun a comprehensive (including in the field of defense) rapprochement with Greece. In 2021, the parties signed a record $1.65 billion agreement to establish and operate a flight training center for Greek Air Force pilots for 22 years. Last December, at a summit in Jerusalem, Israel, Cyprus and Greece agreed on a project for Ankara's systemic deterrence, which includes the creation of a rapid reaction force, joint exercises and cooperation in the field of unmanned technologies. Athens buys Israeli weapons. In particular, we are talking about air defense systems like Spyder and Barak MX, as well as multiple launch rocket systems Puls.
External forces
The Eastern Mediterranean also affects France's economic interests, but Paris is in an ambivalent situation. On the one hand, the Fifth Republic has existing defense agreements with Greece and Cyprus. In April, during a visit to Athens, French President Emmanuel Macron actually stated that his country would side with Greece in the event of a conflict. "This is the famous France—Greece alliance that you mentioned. Alliance and friendship are very simple things. When you go to bed, you don't ask yourself what your friend will do tomorrow. You know that. If your sovereignty is challenged, do whatever you think is necessary for yourself, we will be here," he proclaimed.
The activity of the Elysee Palace in Middle Eastern issues (including Macron's unsuccessful visit to Syria) is also perceived by Ankara as a claim to competition.
SAMP/T Air Defense System
On the other hand, French defense companies would not like to lose Turkey as a buyer. For example, in early July, following consultations with Rome, Macron, after several years of resistance, nevertheless agreed to supply SAMP/T air defense systems, as part of a joint Italian-French project.
It should be recalled that from the very beginning, the Italian oil and gas giant Eni and its French counterpart, the Total group, have played the most important roles in the projects of the Eastern Mediterranean.
They want to involve Egypt in the launching Kronos, but, as experts note, its authorities have no interest in complicating relations with Turkey. Over the past two years, the countries have been experiencing a stage of strategic rapprochement, including in the defense sector.
The Turkish response
It should be noted that Turkey's decision to launch a gas pipeline project to Northern Cyprus is only an element of an overall strategy designed to solve several tasks at once. Ankara seeks to disrupt Israeli plans for an "energy environment", while establishing control over gas logistics, and thus influence European affairs. Turkish experts claim that the new gas pipeline provides the European Union with an alternative to Russian fuel, which may, as Ankara expects, push Brussels to recognize the rights of Turkish Cypriots.
However, it is recognized that such serious geopolitical ambitions should be supported by an active foreign policy in the Middle East in accordance with the recently adopted "Blue Homeland" doctrine. And this is spreading Ankara's already limited resources across a large and unstable region.
Переведено сервисом «Яндекс Переводчик»
