"We have removed the most acute, glaring problems in the bilateral dossier with the United States"

Russia and the United States have resolved the most pressing issues in the bilateral dossier concerning visas and delegation exchanges. This was stated by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov in an interview with Izvestia at the XI International Scientific and Expert forum Primakov Readings. According to him, the parties continue to work on the return of Russian diplomatic property to the United States and the restoration of direct flights. The third round of consultations should take place in the foreseeable future. However, the level of normalization of relations is still insufficient to resume dialogue on strategic stability, Sergei Ryabkov stressed. He noted that against the background of the US and Israeli strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, there are no conditions for restoring the deal on the Iranian program. About Russia's role in resolving the conflict in the Middle East, the future of START-3 and the prospects for an arms race — in an exclusive interview with Sergei Ryabkov to Izvestia.

"This event has already had the most negative impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime"

— On June 22, the United States attacked Iran's nuclear facilities. In your opinion, how will this affect the situation in the Middle East and the nuclear non-proliferation regime?

— This event has already had the most negative impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The country, which is not only a permanent member of the Security Council, but also a depositary of the NPT, launched a targeted attack on three nuclear facilities. They have long been under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the IAEA has not recorded the diversion of nuclear material or nuclear activities to so-called undeclared targets in Iran.

And all the issues that the international community once had about Iran's nuclear program were officially and completely closed in 2015, in parallel with the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear program. After that, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, and in 2025, during its second term in office, the administration decided to launch unprovoked military strikes against important nuclear infrastructure facilities. Thus, years of efforts to restore confidence in the Iranian nuclear program have been undermined.

And today we have a qualitatively new situation. I think many countries have questions in general about what their obligations to the IAEA are worth and how they can further position themselves in this situation, since, as they say, by right of the strong, someone may decide to use methods of influence that are not diplomatic in order to achieve their own goals.

— Can Russia play a mediating role in resolving this confrontation?

— Russia's role in this issue is certainly constructive. We see no alternative to political and diplomatic solutions to any problems. In the current situation, we appeal to the parties not to escalate, but at the same time recognizing that Iran's actions fully comply with the right of this state to self-defense. We believe that it is necessary to stop violent actions, and we address this call to Washington and West Jerusalem.

It is no secret that for a long time the Israeli authorities have denied what was documented by the IAEA and recognized by the international community, and insisted on the military component of the Iranian nuclear program. As a result, we got a situation of a huge new crisis, a fire in the Middle East. Right now, only diplomacy, only politics, which, by the way, the world leaders are talking about, can have its weighty say.

Russia has traditionally offered creative political solutions, schemes, and models throughout the last segment, right up to the American strikes. The President of the Russian Federation is in direct direct contact with all the participants. We offered options, our mediation function and role. This is all, of course, a reflection of our principled approach, these proposals are on the table.

— And if we talk about the JCPOA, in your opinion, is there still a chance for negotiations on this issue, or is the deal no longer possible to restore?

— I don't see the conditions for restoring the JCPOA right now. But this is not equivalent to abandoning diplomacy, quite the contrary. Right now, we need to redouble our efforts to find some solutions that would help stabilize the situation. We can see that they are talking about this in Tehran. We understand the logic and reasoning of our Iranian friends. Of course, stopping the strikes and refusing further escalation from the opposite side is an absolute prerequisite for the Iranian colleagues to consider a political and diplomatic option.

"It is important not to end up in a situation of an uncontrollable, uncontrolled arms race"

— Since the beginning of the year, the presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States have had regular telephone contacts. Are there any interim results of the dialogue on the normalization of relations between Russia and the United States? In what direction will the dialogue between Moscow and Washington continue?

— There are interim results, they are not bad. We have removed the most acute, glaring problems in the bilateral dossier concerning visas and delegation exchanges. We have significantly normalized the financial services of our foreign institutions in both countries. But this is, as they say, the tip of the iceberg. Against the background of what happened during the years when Joe Biden was in power in Washington, of course, a significant step forward has been made, but it is absolutely insufficient to say that we have really made progress towards normalizing relations with the United States.

We need to continue working on this. We think that the third round of bilateral consultations on "irritants," as we call them, should take place in the foreseeable future. The time and place are subject to agreement, and we will work on this. But it is important that the American side recognizes the need to continue these efforts.

Among the larger issues that we have in the foreground is the imperative of returning Russian state property protected by diplomatic immunity, which was unlawfully seized by previous administrations. Of course, we need to restore direct flights, there are a lot of layers and complex issues that need to be dealt with.

There are other issues on the agenda, and I think that the volume of the bilateral dossier, which is now open and needs to be worked out, is also a sign that we are gradually shifting the bilateral dialogue and working on a constructive agenda rather than just blaming each other and multiplying problems. This, I hope, still remains more in the past.

— Is the dialogue with the United States developing on strategic stability, primarily on the future START-3 (Treaty on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms), which expires in February 2026?

— No, there is no such dialogue. And we haven't heard any concrete ideas on this from the current White House team. But for our part, we made it clear to the Americans that progress towards greater normality in relations is clearly insufficient for us to consider resuming dialogue on strategic stability. So as we approach February 5, the deadline for the formal expiration of the START Treaty, which, as you know, has been suspended by us for obvious reasons, I think we may find ourselves in a situation where the future will be determined not at the negotiating table, but through sovereign political decisions in Moscow and Washington.

It is important here not to find yourself in a situation of an uncontrollable, uncontrolled arms race. I think everyone understands the position from which we proceed and on which we base our decisions and actions. This position has been repeatedly stated by the President of the Russian Federation: we will not allow ourselves to be drawn into an expensive arms race, but at the same time our security interests in this area will also be fully secured.

— During the first term, the Trump administration left the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). In your opinion, what is the probability of the deployment of such US missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region?

— She left, and she did it under an absolutely far-fetched pretext. During the Obama administration, we began a dialogue with Washington on the INF Treaty and for several years have been offering Americans creative solutions to address their concerns in this area. But it didn't work. But it didn't work because the Americans needed these systems. And without them, they felt themselves in a situation of limited optionality in the military sphere. First of all, in the confrontation with a strategic opponent. So, perhaps, we can speak generically. More specifically, in the confrontation with us and the People's Republic of China. Under Biden, we have seen very disturbing reports and decisions about the deployment of such systems, allegedly on a rotational basis, but in fact on a permanent basis in several regions of the world.

There is nothing to indicate that these decisions have been reviewed or reversed under Trump. Therefore, we must assume that they will be implemented. And in our foreign policy and military planning, I can say, although I am not directly involved in this, we proceed from this reality. The unilateral moratorium on the deployment of such systems, which was announced by the President of the Russian Federation, is losing its relevance given the current situation. He is acting, but the situation is blurring the basis of his action. Therefore, if the previously announced plans and intentions of the American side are implemented, we will be forced to consider taking compensatory measures.

— So it is possible to cancel this moratorium in the future?

— Nothing can be ruled out.